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FAST

Netfigo Verdict
on Fast

Fast raised $124.5 million to build one-click checkout. Stripe already had this. Shopify already had this. Apple Pay already had this. Fast launched in 2019, burned through its entire war chest in three years, and shut down in April 2022 with reportedly only $600,000 in annual revenue. That's a $124.5 million spend for $600K in revenue. Someone check the math on the "fast" part.

Founded

2019

HQ

San Francisco, USA

Total Raised

$124.5 million

Founder

Domm Holland, Allison Barr Allen

Status

Shut down (2022)

THE ORIGIN STORY

Domm Holland was an Australian entrepreneur who had sold his previous company, Tapster, and moved to San Francisco. He co-founded Fast with Allison Barr Allen in 2019.

The pitch was simple: online checkout is broken. People abandon carts because typing in credit card numbers, shipping addresses, and email addresses is annoying.

Fast would store your payment info once and let you buy from any participating merchant with a single click. One button.

No passwords. No forms.

WHAT THEY ACTUALLY DO

Fast was a checkout button that online merchants could add to their stores. When a customer clicked "Fast Checkout," the purchase completed instantly using stored payment and shipping information.

Fast planned to charge merchants a small percentage of each transaction — the standard payments model. The company positioned itself as a layer on top of Stripe, handling the front-end experience while Stripe processed the actual payment.

The problem: Stripe launched its own one-click checkout product, Link, which did the same thing.

THE PRODUCTS

Fast Checkout was the core product — a button that merchants embedded on their e-commerce sites. Customers created a Fast account once, stored their payment method and shipping address, and could then buy from any participating merchant with one click.

Fast Login was a companion product that let users sign into websites without passwords. The company also offered a developer API for custom integrations.

The technology worked fine. The market didn't need it.

HOW THEY GREW

Domm Holland was a prolific Twitter personality. He built a massive following by tweeting about startup culture, hiring, and Fast's mission with infectious enthusiasm.

The brand awareness was real — Fast was one of the most talked-about fintech startups on tech Twitter. Holland also landed a $102 million Series B from Stripe, Addition (Lee Fixel), and Index Ventures in January 2021.

Having Stripe as both an investor and the underlying payment processor seemed like a massive strategic advantage. It turned out to be something else entirely.

THE HARD PART

Revenue. Fast reportedly had only around $600,000 in annual recurring revenue at the time it shut down, despite having raised $124.5 million and employing over 400 people.

Merchant adoption was extremely slow. The one-click checkout value proposition sounded good in pitches but was hard to sell to merchants who already had Shopify's checkout, Apple Pay, Google Pay, and increasingly Stripe's own Link product.

Switching costs were low and the differentiation was unclear.

WHO BACKED THEM

Fast raised $124.5 million in total. The seed round brought in $2.5 million.

The Series A raised $20 million led by Index Ventures. The Series B was a massive $102 million round in January 2021, led by Stripe, with participation from Addition (Lee Fixel) and Index Ventures.

Stripe's investment was the headline — having the world's most valuable private fintech company invest in your checkout product seemed like ultimate validation. In hindsight, it may have been Stripe doing due diligence on a potential feature, not a potential company.

POST-MORTEM

Why It Failed

Fast burned through $124.5 million in three years while generating almost no revenue. The company reportedly had only around $600,000 in annual revenue when it shut down — meaning it spent roughly $200 for every $1 it earned.

The core problem was product-market fit. One-click checkout already existed in multiple forms.

Apple Pay, Google Pay, Shop Pay (Shopify), and Amazon's checkout all solved the same problem for consumers. Merchants didn't see enough incremental conversion lift from Fast to justify adding another checkout button.

The product worked technically but didn't move the needle commercially.

Stripe's dual role as investor and potential competitor made things worse. In 2021, Stripe launched Link, its own one-click checkout product built directly into Stripe's payment flow.

Link did essentially what Fast did, but it was native to Stripe — no extra integration needed. Fast, which ran on top of Stripe, was now competing with its own infrastructure provider.

By early 2022, Fast couldn't raise more money. The company shut down on April 5, 2022, giving employees just a few hours' notice.

Money Burned

$124.5 million

The Lesson

If your investor is also building the same product you're building, you're not a partner. You're a test case.

Head-to-Head

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