Klarna

Sea Group

Klarna

Klarna makes money from merchant fees and consumer interest. Merchants pay Klarna 3-6% of each transaction — they're willing to pay because Klarna increases conversion rates by 30%+ and average order values by 45%.

On "Pay in 4" (interest-free installments), Klarna makes money purely from merchant fees. On longer financing (6-36 months), Klarna charges consumers interest up to 25% APR.

Klarna also earns revenue from its shopping app (affiliate commissions when users discover and buy from merchants), and from its Klarna Card.

Sea Group

Sea runs three distinct businesses under one roof, and the genius of the structure is how they feed each other.

Garena is the gaming division. It develops and publishes games — most famously Free Fire, which Sea built itself after years of just licensing other people's games.

Free Fire launched in 2017 and became a phenomenon in emerging markets. It's a battle royale game optimized for low-end Android devices and slow internet connections.

Exactly the phone most people in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and India actually own. Garena makes money through in-game purchases — skins, characters, seasonal passes.

At its peak, Free Fire had over 100 million daily active users.

Shopee is the e-commerce marketplace. It operates like a hybrid of Amazon and eBay — sellers list products, buyers purchase, Sea handles payments, logistics coordination, and marketing.

Shopee makes money through advertising, transaction fees, and value-added services for sellers. It's now the dominant e-commerce platform in Southeast Asia and has a significant presence in Brazil.

SeaMoney is the fintech arm. It offers mobile wallets, digital payments, buy-now-pay-later, and banking services through MariBank in Singapore.

The pitch is simple: hundreds of millions of people in Southeast Asia are unbanked or underbanked. Give them a mobile wallet tied to their Shopee account and they'll use it for everything.

It's the super-app play, executed patiently.

Klarna

Sebastian Siemiatkowski, Niklas Adalberth, and Victor Jacobsson were students at the Stockholm School of Economics. In 2005, they entered a startup competition with an idea: let people buy things online and pay later.

At the time, online shopping was still new and most people were terrified of entering their credit card details on the internet. The idea was simple — Klarna would pay the merchant immediately, and the customer would get an invoice with 14-30 days to pay.

The competition judges hated it. The idea was dismissed as financially irresponsible and the team didn't win.

But Siemiatkowski pressed on. Swedish e-commerce was growing fast and merchants were desperate for any way to reduce cart abandonment.

Klarna's "pay after delivery" model was a hit because it shifted the risk — customers could receive the product, try it on, and only pay for what they kept.

The first customers were Swedish e-commerce merchants selling fashion and home goods. Klarna handled the invoicing, fraud detection, and collections.

Merchants saw conversion rates jump because customers were more willing to buy when they didn't have to pay immediately.

Sea Group

Forrest Li moved from China to Singapore in 2005 to do his MBA at Stanford. He didn't go back.

In 2009, he founded Garena — which literally means 'Global Arena' — as an online gaming platform for Southeast Asia. The region was massively underserved.

Hundreds of millions of young, mobile-first users with low PC penetration but exploding smartphone adoption. Nobody was building for them.

Li saw that gap and went straight at it.

Garena started by licensing popular PC games — League of Legends, FIFA Online — and localizing them for markets like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. It was a straightforward licensing model, unglamorous, not the kind of thing that gets TechCrunch headlines.

But it worked. Garena quietly became the dominant gaming platform across Southeast Asia.

The company rebranded to Sea Limited in 2017 when it IPO'd on the New York Stock Exchange, raising $884 million. By then, Li had already launched Shopee in 2015 — an e-commerce marketplace — and SeaMoney, a digital payments and financial services arm, was taking shape.

Three businesses. One holding company.

The bet was that gaming would fund the others until they could stand on their own. That's exactly what happened.

Klarna

Klarna grew by being embedded at checkout. The strategy was to sign up the biggest online retailers and become a payment option alongside Visa and PayPal.

Once Klarna was at checkout, consumers discovered it organically. The "Pay in 4" button became ubiquitous across fashion, electronics, and home goods retailers.

The Klarna app became a growth engine beyond checkout. By building a shopping app where users could browse products, discover deals, and track deliveries, Klarna turned from a payment method into a shopping destination.

The app has 35+ million monthly active users who start their shopping journey inside Klarna before even visiting a retailer.

International expansion was aggressive. Starting in Sweden, Klarna rolled out across Europe, then into the US, UK, and Australia.

The US became the biggest growth market — American consumers were especially receptive to Pay in 4 as an alternative to credit cards. By 2023, Klarna had 34 million US users.

Sea Group

The counterintuitive move was using gaming to subsidize e-commerce. Most tech companies pick a lane.

Sea used Garena's cash flows — which were enormous when Free Fire was at its peak — to fund Shopee's aggressive, money-losing expansion. They didn't need to raise debt or dilute shareholders to burn cash in new markets.

The gaming division was basically an ATM.

Free Fire itself was a masterclass in product-market fit. Instead of porting a premium game to low-end markets and watching it fail, Sea built a battle royale game from scratch that ran on 1GB RAM Android phones with patchy 3G connections.

The game was optimized for exactly the hardware that 800 million people in emerging markets actually owned. Nobody else was doing that.

Shopee's growth hack was localization taken to an almost absurd degree. They didn't just translate the app.

They hired local teams in every market, ran country-specific campaigns, integrated local payment methods, and partnered with local logistics providers. In Brazil, they ran Shopee-branded motorbike delivery.

In Indonesia, they integrated with hundreds of local courier companies. The playbook was: be more local than the locals.

The final piece was the flywheel. A Garena user downloads Free Fire, spends money on in-game items using SeaMoney's wallet, then starts buying physical goods on Shopee with the same wallet.

Three products, one ecosystem, one user. That's the compounding effect Li was building toward from day one.

Klarna

The valuation collapse was humiliating. Klarna raised at a $46 billion valuation from SoftBank in 2021.

One year later, they raised a down round at $6.7 billion — an 85% haircut. It was the most dramatic valuation drop in fintech history.

Employee stock options were underwater. Siemiatkowski had to lay off 10% of the workforce.

The entire BNPL category went from hot to radioactive in months.

Credit losses are the existential risk. Klarna is lending money to consumers who want to buy things they can't afford to pay for right now.

When the economy slows, defaults rise. Klarna's credit losses ran to roughly $600 million in 2022.

The company had to tighten underwriting significantly and pull back from riskier markets. The tension between growth (approve more loans) and profitability (reject risky borrowers) defines every quarter.

The IPO in 2025 was a comeback story but with caveats. Klarna went public at $15 billion — a major recovery from the $6.7 billion trough but still less than a third of its 2021 peak.

The company finally turned profitable by slashing costs with AI (replacing hundreds of customer service agents with AI chatbots) and tightening credit standards. But investors remain cautious about the BNPL model's long-term sustainability.

Sea Group

The post-pandemic collapse was brutal and nearly existential for the stock, if not the business. During COVID, Sea was the perfect story — gaming was up, e-commerce was up, digital payments were up.

The stock hit $372 in October 2021. Market cap touched $200 billion.

Sea was the most valuable company ever to come out of Southeast Asia.

Then the world opened back up. Free Fire's daily active users fell off a cliff as people left their homes again.

Garena had funded the empire, and now the empire's funding engine was broken. Sea lost its license to publish Free Fire in India after the Indian government banned Chinese-linked apps.

India had been a massive market. Gone overnight.

Sea responded by cutting costs aggressively — laying off staff, retreating from markets like France, Spain, Poland, and India where Shopee had expanded without yet reaching profitability. The stock fell from $372 to under $40 by early 2023.

A 90% drawdown. That's not a correction.

That's a reset.

The deeper challenge is structural. Shopee competes with Lazada (backed by Alibaba), TikTok Shop (which has exploded in Southeast Asia), and increasingly with Temu and Shein.

These are not small competitors. TikTok Shop in particular has disrupted the e-commerce landscape in Indonesia and Thailand faster than most analysts expected.

Sea has scale and local knowledge, but the fight for Southeast Asia's e-commerce market is far from over.

Klarna

Pay in 4 is the signature product — split any purchase into four interest-free payments over six weeks. Pay in 30 lets customers receive the product first and pay within 30 days.

Financing offers longer-term payment plans with interest for larger purchases. The Klarna App is a shopping destination — browse deals, track orders, manage payments, and earn cashback.

The Klarna Card is a physical Visa card that lets users Pay in 4 anywhere. Klarna Creator is a platform for influencers to earn commissions sharing products.

Klarna AI is their customer service chatbot that handles two-thirds of support queries.

Sea Group

Free Fire is the crown jewel — a mobile battle royale game with over 100 million daily active users at its peak, built specifically for low-end Android devices in emerging markets. It's been the most downloaded mobile game globally multiple times and remains dominant across Southeast Asia and Latin America despite declining from its COVID peak.

Shopee is Sea's e-commerce marketplace and the business with the highest long-term ceiling. It operates across Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, and Brazil.

It's consistently ranked the most-visited e-commerce site in Southeast Asia. The app includes livestream shopping, local seller tools, Shopee Pay, and Shopee Food in select markets.

SeaMoney — now operating as the financial services umbrella — includes ShopeePay (mobile wallet integrated with the Shopee checkout), SeaBank (a licensed digital bank in the Philippines and Indonesia), and MariBank (a digital bank in Singapore). The pitch is financial inclusion for the underbanked, backed by transaction data from Shopee.

Klarna

Sequoia Capital, SoftBank, Silver Lake, GIC, Atomico, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Heartland

Sea Group

Sea went public in 2017 without needing a late-stage mega-round from the usual suspects. But it had institutional backing from early on.

Tencent is the most significant external shareholder — the Chinese gaming giant held a roughly 22% stake at various points, which gave Sea both credibility in gaming and a complicated geopolitical headache as anti-China sentiment grew in Southeast Asia and the U.S.

Naveen Tewari's General Atlantic and other growth equity funds participated in rounds before the IPO. Post-IPO, Sea attracted attention from large institutional investors including T.

Rowe Price, BlackRock, and various sovereign wealth funds drawn to the Southeast Asia growth story.

Masayoshi Son's SoftBank also took a stake — consistent with SoftBank's bet on emerging market consumer internet platforms. The Tencent relationship is the most interesting one because it's both a competitive asset (access to gaming IP and distribution) and a liability (political risk in markets sensitive to Chinese corporate influence).