Slack

Sea Group

Slack

Slack uses a freemium model. The free tier gives you access to your most recent 90 days of messages and 10 app integrations.

That's enough to get hooked. Then Slack charges per user per month — $8.75/month for Pro, $15/month for Business+, and custom pricing for Enterprise Grid.

The beauty of the model is that one person signs up, invites their team, the team gets addicted, and suddenly the company is paying for 500 seats. It's a virus that charges rent.

Sea Group

Sea runs three distinct businesses under one roof, and the genius of the structure is how they feed each other.

Garena is the gaming division. It develops and publishes games — most famously Free Fire, which Sea built itself after years of just licensing other people's games.

Free Fire launched in 2017 and became a phenomenon in emerging markets. It's a battle royale game optimized for low-end Android devices and slow internet connections.

Exactly the phone most people in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and India actually own. Garena makes money through in-game purchases — skins, characters, seasonal passes.

At its peak, Free Fire had over 100 million daily active users.

Shopee is the e-commerce marketplace. It operates like a hybrid of Amazon and eBay — sellers list products, buyers purchase, Sea handles payments, logistics coordination, and marketing.

Shopee makes money through advertising, transaction fees, and value-added services for sellers. It's now the dominant e-commerce platform in Southeast Asia and has a significant presence in Brazil.

SeaMoney is the fintech arm. It offers mobile wallets, digital payments, buy-now-pay-later, and banking services through MariBank in Singapore.

The pitch is simple: hundreds of millions of people in Southeast Asia are unbanked or underbanked. Give them a mobile wallet tied to their Shopee account and they'll use it for everything.

It's the super-app play, executed patiently.

Slack

Stewart Butterfield had already done this exact thing once before. In 2002, he was building a massively multiplayer online game called Game Neverending.

The game flopped but one of its features — a photo-sharing tool — became Flickr, which Yahoo bought for $35 million in 2005.

So in 2009, Butterfield did it again. He started a company called Tiny Speck to build another game called Glitch — a quirky, non-violent MMO where players collaborated instead of fighting.

The game was beautiful, weird, and a complete commercial failure. It shut down in November 2012 after never finding a big enough audience.

But the internal communication tool the Glitch team had built for themselves was something special. They had created a searchable, organized messaging system because email was driving them insane.

Every conversation was in channels. Everything was searchable.

Files were shared inline. It was everything email should have been but wasn't.

Butterfield looked at this internal tool and thought: this is the actual product. In August 2013, Slack launched in preview.

Within 24 hours, 8,000 companies had signed up. Within two weeks, it was 15,000.

The growth was so fast that Butterfield said it felt like "trying to drink from a fire hose."

Sea Group

Forrest Li moved from China to Singapore in 2005 to do his MBA at Stanford. He didn't go back.

In 2009, he founded Garena — which literally means 'Global Arena' — as an online gaming platform for Southeast Asia. The region was massively underserved.

Hundreds of millions of young, mobile-first users with low PC penetration but exploding smartphone adoption. Nobody was building for them.

Li saw that gap and went straight at it.

Garena started by licensing popular PC games — League of Legends, FIFA Online — and localizing them for markets like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. It was a straightforward licensing model, unglamorous, not the kind of thing that gets TechCrunch headlines.

But it worked. Garena quietly became the dominant gaming platform across Southeast Asia.

The company rebranded to Sea Limited in 2017 when it IPO'd on the New York Stock Exchange, raising $884 million. By then, Li had already launched Shopee in 2015 — an e-commerce marketplace — and SeaMoney, a digital payments and financial services arm, was taking shape.

Three businesses. One holding company.

The bet was that gaming would fund the others until they could stand on their own. That's exactly what happened.

Slack

Slack grew almost entirely bottom-up. Nobody sold Slack to companies.

Employees adopted it on their own and then convinced their bosses to pay for it. One developer would start using the free version, invite their team, and within weeks the whole department was hooked.

IT departments would discover that half the company was already on Slack before anyone asked for approval.

The integrations strategy was genius. Slack made it dead simple for other software tools to plug into Slack.

Instead of checking Jira for bug reports, Salesforce for deals, and GitHub for code changes, everything pushed notifications into Slack. Slack became the operating system of work — the one app you kept open all day.

Word of mouth was the main growth driver. Slack didn't spend heavily on advertising early on.

They spent on making the product feel delightful. The loading messages were funny.

The emoji reactions were addictive. The search actually worked.

People genuinely liked using it, which is almost unheard of for enterprise software.

Sea Group

The counterintuitive move was using gaming to subsidize e-commerce. Most tech companies pick a lane.

Sea used Garena's cash flows — which were enormous when Free Fire was at its peak — to fund Shopee's aggressive, money-losing expansion. They didn't need to raise debt or dilute shareholders to burn cash in new markets.

The gaming division was basically an ATM.

Free Fire itself was a masterclass in product-market fit. Instead of porting a premium game to low-end markets and watching it fail, Sea built a battle royale game from scratch that ran on 1GB RAM Android phones with patchy 3G connections.

The game was optimized for exactly the hardware that 800 million people in emerging markets actually owned. Nobody else was doing that.

Shopee's growth hack was localization taken to an almost absurd degree. They didn't just translate the app.

They hired local teams in every market, ran country-specific campaigns, integrated local payment methods, and partnered with local logistics providers. In Brazil, they ran Shopee-branded motorbike delivery.

In Indonesia, they integrated with hundreds of local courier companies. The playbook was: be more local than the locals.

The final piece was the flywheel. A Garena user downloads Free Fire, spends money on in-game items using SeaMoney's wallet, then starts buying physical goods on Shopee with the same wallet.

Three products, one ecosystem, one user. That's the compounding effect Li was building toward from day one.

Slack

Microsoft Teams was the existential threat. When Microsoft bundled Teams for free with Office 365 in 2017, Slack knew it was in trouble.

Microsoft had 300 million Office users who could start using Teams without paying anything extra. Slack even took out a full-page newspaper ad welcoming Microsoft to the chat market — a bravado move that masked genuine fear.

By 2020, Teams had overtaken Slack in daily active users purely on distribution.

The pandemic was a double-edged sword. Remote work exploded demand for Slack, but it also exploded demand for Teams, Zoom, and every other collaboration tool.

Slack's growth accelerated but so did everyone else's. The window where Slack was the obvious default was closing.

Revenue growth started slowing. After years of 50%+ annual growth, Slack's growth rate dropped to the low 30s by 2020.

Wall Street punished the stock, which dropped from its IPO price. The writing was on the wall — Slack couldn't outrun Microsoft alone.

In December 2020, Salesforce announced it was acquiring Slack for $27.7 billion. Butterfield stayed on as CEO until 2023, then left.

Sea Group

The post-pandemic collapse was brutal and nearly existential for the stock, if not the business. During COVID, Sea was the perfect story — gaming was up, e-commerce was up, digital payments were up.

The stock hit $372 in October 2021. Market cap touched $200 billion.

Sea was the most valuable company ever to come out of Southeast Asia.

Then the world opened back up. Free Fire's daily active users fell off a cliff as people left their homes again.

Garena had funded the empire, and now the empire's funding engine was broken. Sea lost its license to publish Free Fire in India after the Indian government banned Chinese-linked apps.

India had been a massive market. Gone overnight.

Sea responded by cutting costs aggressively — laying off staff, retreating from markets like France, Spain, Poland, and India where Shopee had expanded without yet reaching profitability. The stock fell from $372 to under $40 by early 2023.

A 90% drawdown. That's not a correction.

That's a reset.

The deeper challenge is structural. Shopee competes with Lazada (backed by Alibaba), TikTok Shop (which has exploded in Southeast Asia), and increasingly with Temu and Shein.

These are not small competitors. TikTok Shop in particular has disrupted the e-commerce landscape in Indonesia and Thailand faster than most analysts expected.

Sea has scale and local knowledge, but the fight for Southeast Asia's e-commerce market is far from over.

Slack

Slack is the core messaging platform — channels for teams, direct messages, threads for focused discussion, and huddles for quick voice/video calls. Slack Connect lets you message people at other companies directly through Slack instead of email.

Slack Canvas is a built-in document editor for notes and wikis right inside channels. Workflow Builder lets non-technical users automate repetitive tasks without writing code.

The App Directory has 2,600+ integrations — connect Google Drive, Salesforce, Jira, GitHub, or basically any tool your company uses.

Sea Group

Free Fire is the crown jewel — a mobile battle royale game with over 100 million daily active users at its peak, built specifically for low-end Android devices in emerging markets. It's been the most downloaded mobile game globally multiple times and remains dominant across Southeast Asia and Latin America despite declining from its COVID peak.

Shopee is Sea's e-commerce marketplace and the business with the highest long-term ceiling. It operates across Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, and Brazil.

It's consistently ranked the most-visited e-commerce site in Southeast Asia. The app includes livestream shopping, local seller tools, Shopee Pay, and Shopee Food in select markets.

SeaMoney — now operating as the financial services umbrella — includes ShopeePay (mobile wallet integrated with the Shopee checkout), SeaBank (a licensed digital bank in the Philippines and Indonesia), and MariBank (a digital bank in Singapore). The pitch is financial inclusion for the underbanked, backed by transaction data from Shopee.

Slack

Accel Partners, Andreessen Horowitz, Social Capital, GV (Google Ventures), SoftBank, Dragoneer Investment Group

Sea Group

Sea went public in 2017 without needing a late-stage mega-round from the usual suspects. But it had institutional backing from early on.

Tencent is the most significant external shareholder — the Chinese gaming giant held a roughly 22% stake at various points, which gave Sea both credibility in gaming and a complicated geopolitical headache as anti-China sentiment grew in Southeast Asia and the U.S.

Naveen Tewari's General Atlantic and other growth equity funds participated in rounds before the IPO. Post-IPO, Sea attracted attention from large institutional investors including T.

Rowe Price, BlackRock, and various sovereign wealth funds drawn to the Southeast Asia growth story.

Masayoshi Son's SoftBank also took a stake — consistent with SoftBank's bet on emerging market consumer internet platforms. The Tencent relationship is the most interesting one because it's both a competitive asset (access to gaming IP and distribution) and a liability (political risk in markets sensitive to Chinese corporate influence).