Warby Parker

Instacart

Warby Parker

Vertically integrated DTC eyewear — Warby Parker designs frames in-house, contracts manufacturing directly (cutting out the brand licensing middlemen), and sells directly to consumers through its website and owned retail stores. The $95 price point (later raised to $95-$195) eliminates the traditional retail markup chain.

Home Try-On program lets customers pick five frames to try for free before buying. Revenue comes from prescription glasses, sunglasses, contact lenses, and eye exams (offered in stores).

The company expanded from pure e-commerce into physical retail with 200+ stores, making it an omnichannel brand rather than purely online.

Instacart

Instacart operates as a marketplace connecting consumers with personal shoppers and grocery retailers. Revenue comes from multiple streams: delivery fees and service fees charged to consumers (typically $3.99+ per delivery), tips to shoppers (passed through, not revenue), retailer partnerships (grocers pay Instacart for access to the platform and fulfillment services), and advertising.

Advertising has become the crown jewel. Instacart Ads lets consumer packaged goods (CPG) brands like Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Nestlé pay for sponsored product placements within the Instacart shopping experience.

When someone searches for "chips," Doritos can pay to appear first. This is incredibly valuable because it's advertising at the exact moment of purchase intent.

Ad revenue was $871 million in 2023 and crossed $950 million in 2024.

The retailer partnership model is key. Unlike DoorDash or Uber Eats (which listed restaurants without permission early on), Instacart works with grocers as partners.

Over 1,500 retail banners including Costco, Kroger, Albertsons, and Publix have formal partnerships. Instacart provides the technology and shoppers.

Grocers provide inventory and stores.

Warby Parker

Neil Blumenthal lost a pair of glasses backpacking and couldn't believe replacing them cost $700. He mentioned this at Wharton Business School, where classmates Dave Gilboa, Andrew Hunt, and Jeffrey Raider were having the same reaction.

They dug into the economics and discovered that Luxottica — an Italian conglomerate most people have never heard of — owned Ray-Ban, Oakley, LensCrafters, Sunglass Hut, Pearle Vision, and the licensing rights for Chanel, Prada, and Versace. One company controlled the supply chain from design to retail and priced accordingly.

The four students launched Warby Parker in February 2010 with a simple website selling prescription glasses for $95 — about a quarter of what Luxottica charged. GQ called them "the Netflix of eyewear" before they'd shipped their 100th pair.

They hit their first-year sales target in three weeks and had a 20,000-person waitlist within 48 hours of launch.

Instacart

Apoorva Mehta was a 26-year-old Amazon engineer in Seattle who quit his job in 2012 to start a company. The only problem: he had no idea what to build.

Over the next year, he started and abandoned roughly 20 different projects. A social network for lawyers.

A way to track restaurant wait times. Nothing stuck.

Then one day he was too lazy to go grocery shopping. He looked for a service that would shop for him and deliver everything to his door.

Nothing good existed. The existing options were grocery store delivery services that only worked during specific windows, had limited selection, and required ordering days in advance.

Mehta wanted to order groceries the way he ordered everything else online — immediately, from whatever store he wanted.

He built a prototype in 2012 and applied to Y Combinator. The demo was rough — he ordered a six-pack of beer through the app and had it delivered to a YC partner's house during the application process.

It worked. He got in.

Instacart launched in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2013 with a simple promise: order from your favorite local grocery store and have someone shop for you and deliver within an hour.

Warby Parker

The DTC playbook: build a beautiful brand, price dramatically below incumbents, and tell a compelling story about why the old way was a rip-off. The Home Try-On program was brilliant viral marketing — people posted photos of themselves in five different frames on social media asking friends to vote.

"Buy a Pair, Give a Pair" philanthropy (one pair donated for every pair sold) gave the brand a social mission that resonated with millennials. Physical retail expansion gave customers who wanted to try before they buy a real store experience.

Celebrity endorsements and fashion magazine coverage positioned Warby Parker as a lifestyle brand, not just a discount option. Steady geographic expansion of stores into new markets, each store becoming a customer acquisition channel.

Instacart

Instacart grew by solving a problem one city at a time. They launched in San Francisco, proved the model, then expanded to other major metros.

Each new market required recruiting shoppers, signing up retailers, and building enough consumer density to make the economics work.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the inflection point. Grocery delivery went from luxury to necessity overnight.

In March 2020 Instacart announced it would add 300,000 shoppers, then raised that by another 250,000 weeks later. Order volume increased 500%.

Years of planned growth happened in weeks. The pandemic proved that grocery delivery wasn't a niche — it was the future of how a significant chunk of the population would shop.

The enterprise play is the long-term moat. By providing white-label technology to grocers, Instacart becomes embedded in their operations.

Even if a grocery chain wanted to build its own delivery service, they'd need years and hundreds of millions to replicate what Instacart provides. The more deeply integrated Instacart becomes in grocery operations, the harder it is to rip out.

Warby Parker

Luxottica (now EssilorLuxottica after merging with the world's largest lens maker) remains a $90 billion behemoth with resources Warby Parker can't match. Post-IPO stock performance has been disappointing — shares fell over 70% from their 2021 highs as the DTC bubble deflated.

Physical retail expansion is capital-intensive and each store needs to reach profitability. Competition from dozens of DTC eyewear brands (Zenni, EyeBuyDirect, Pair Eyewear) that copied the model and often undercut Warby Parker on price.

Prescription eyewear requires optometrist involvement, which adds complexity and regulatory overhead compared to selling non-prescription consumer products. And the fundamental challenge of glasses: people only buy them every 1-3 years, making customer lifetime value dependent on retention across very long purchase cycles.

Instacart

The post-COVID hangover was brutal. After pandemic demand normalized, growth slowed dramatically.

The company's valuation dropped from a peak of $39 billion in early 2021 to about $10 billion at IPO in September 2023. Investors who bought at the peak saw a 75% paper loss.

The narrative shifted from "essential infrastructure" to "nice-to-have luxury."

Unit economics are perpetually tight. Paying a person to walk through a grocery store, pick items, bag them, and drive them to someone's house is expensive.

Unlike meal delivery (one restaurant, one bag), grocery delivery involves dozens of items per order, refrigeration requirements, and substitution decisions. Every order that requires a shopper to call the customer about an out-of-stock item eats into efficiency.

Amazon is the existential threat. Amazon Fresh, Whole Foods delivery, and Amazon's own logistics network represent a competitor with nearly unlimited resources and a Prime membership base of 200+ million.

Amazon has been willing to lose billions on grocery delivery to build market share. Instacart's advantage is retailer partnerships — Kroger and Publix use Instacart specifically because they don't want to help Amazon dominate grocery.

Warby Parker

Prescription eyeglasses starting at $95 including basic lenses — the product that broke the Luxottica pricing model. Home Try-On — pick five frames online, receive them in a box, try them at home for free, return what you don't want.

Progressive lenses and blue-light-filtering options for higher-end needs. Prescription and non-prescription sunglasses.

Scout contact lenses — Warby Parker's daily disposable contact lens brand. In-store eye exams with licensed optometrists.

Virtual Try-On using iPhone face-scanning technology to see frames on your face through the app.

Instacart

Instacart Marketplace — the core platform where consumers order groceries from 80,000+ stores for delivery or pickup, with personal shoppers fulfilling orders. Instacart+ — subscription service ($9.99/month) offering free delivery on orders over $35, reduced service fees, and credit back on pickup orders.

Instacart Ads — a retail media platform letting CPG brands run sponsored product listings, display ads, and coupons within the shopping experience. Instacart Platform (Enterprise) — white-label e-commerce technology that lets grocers build their own online ordering and fulfillment powered by Instacart's infrastructure.

Caper Cart — AI-powered smart shopping carts (from the 2021 Caper AI acquisition) with built-in screens, barcode scanners, and payment that let shoppers skip the checkout line.

Warby Parker

Pre-IPO investors included General Catalyst, Tiger Global Management, T. Rowe Price, Durable Capital Partners, and D1 Capital Partners.

The company went public on the NYSE in September 2021 via direct listing.

Instacart

Sequoia Capital was an early and consistent backer. Andreessen Horowitz invested in growth rounds.

D1 Capital Partners led the 2021 round that valued Instacart at $39 billion. Existing investors including Valiant Capital, T.

Rowe Price, Fidelity, and Tiger Global participated across rounds. Y Combinator was the starting point (Summer 2012 batch).

The September 2023 IPO on NASDAQ priced at $30 per share, valuing the company at approximately $10 billion.